(2) The sheer quantity and nature, scope and scale of Weber's theoretical, empirical and practical researches touch on virtually all areas involving economics, history, social sciences, methodology and technique, politics and law, and less directly on music, anthropology, classical studies, natural sciences and practical concerns bearing on agriculture, trade and commerce (Lazarsfeld and Oberschall, 1965 ; and Swedberg's work under review here). Weber was a polymath by any reckoning, which has made it not only relatively easy, but necessary and usually fruitful, to investigate some particular area of his researches and not others, in pursuit of the validation of a position on a specific matter or controversy. Weber uniquely manages to combine this status as a polymath at a point well after the modern division of academic labor was underway with that of a 'classical' scholar in these fields, one who was at one and the same time thoroughly original and a master synthesist. In addition, Weber not only participated in many commissions of inquiry into practical problems and attempted to address or settle disputes in many of the academic and professional fields mentioned above, but helped create significant research traditions and even whole areas of study through his prodigious efforts (Schluchter, 1981 (Schluchter, , 1989 (Schluchter, , 1996 . Raymond Aron gets it so right in German Sociology (1964 [1937] ) when he puts Max Weber in a category of his own beyond both the formal and systematic sociology so prominent in Germany between 1890 and 1930. (3) Over the last 20-30 years, there has been an increasing concern quite independent of postmodernism to re-evaluate the contribution of modern Western civilization, in the form of its specific institutions and the institutional matrix itself (Loewith, 1970) . In this re-evaluation, Weber's prodigious studies in so many fields, combined with his theoretical contributions to method, epistemology, comparative studies and our understanding of medieval and modern institutions, looms large. While some of this interest indicates concern for the fate of the individual in a national state, and a supranational and global order, it is also inspired by neo-liberal criticisms of government, bureaucracy and the ubiquity of legal formalism. In the latter case, it is the all-embracing commitment to laws, rules and regulations as the essence of the normative political, economic and social agenda under neo-Keynesian policies that inspires these criticisms.
II
The three books under review in this essay address virtually all these themes, as their titles and subtitles only partly indicate. In what follows, I intend to balance a (re)citation of the contents and ideas of each book, and thoughts emerging directly from these contents and ideas, with an opportunity to think and reflect on my own. In this sense, I shall to some extent treat discussion of these texts as an occasion to theorize precisely because of the opportunity their scrutiny has provided me with. Having said this, Boucock's title and subtitle belie the fact that his major concern is with the peculiar nature of Western rationalism and the role it plays in Weber's analysis of key institutions and practices, particularly formal legal rationality. In Chapter 1, his focus on the 'specific and peculiar rationalism of Western culture' is directed to 'the formal rationality of modern economic and political arrangements' manifested most prominently in 'capitalism', with its 'instrumental calculus of profit', and 'bureaucracy', with its 'methodical observance of rules'.
The rest of the chapter is of particular interest because of its innovative discussion of 'Weber's existential epistemology' as it works itself out in a necessarily post-religious, secular and positivist analysis of values, from which there arises a normative space of choice and consent for Weber. Boucock makes a persuasive case that for Weber the space of choice and consent not only arises from this analysis of values but presupposes it. For the thoughtful reader this is supremely remindful of Weber's seminal and definitive remark in Economy and Society. Any effort to determine and delimit what is to be called 'formal', Weber states, must acknowledge that 'in this context the concept "substantive" is itself in a certain sense "formal", that is, it is an abstract, generic concept ' (1978 [1956, 1964] : 86). The obvious question, apart from Weber's sleight of hand, evident in his reliance on different understandings of the concept 'formal', is why the reverse is instead not true. Why isn't the concept 'formal' in a certain sense 'substantive' (Wilson, 2000) ?
It is as a consequence of this conceptual bias and pre-eminence of the generically and specifically formal in determining and delimiting rationality that the contest posed to its 'progress' by the individual as a willing and acting, rather than merely behaving, 'person' approaches a zero-sum game for Weber. In legal terms, this implies that any challenge by this individual to 'occupancy of the field' by formal rationality and the generically and specifically formal in all its many institutional manifestations is ultimately futile. One exception to this, albeit only temporarily, is the acting and willing of the decisionistic leader, who became for Weber a greater evil than even the subordination of a new fellaheen to ubiquitous rationalization insofar as such a leader preached an ethic of ultimate ends to the exclusion of an ethic of responsibility. The implication is that only large congeries of individuals acting and willing, rather than just behaving, might make possible the constitutional and representative framework that would restrain and constructively direct such decisionism.
To be sure, this subordination to the rationalization process, though preferable to the charismatic irrationality that is only ever possible with the assistance of some legitimizing 'myth of authority', remains a lesser evil for Weber (MacIver, 1947) . Assisted by his significant reformulation of Weber's formal/ substantive distinction into one that instead contrasts functional to substantial rationality, Karl Mannheim would address himself later on to the difficulties inherent in Weber's lukewarm endorsement of an ethic of responsibility. Mannheim was particularly concerned to flesh out the implications of this ethic for the relation between (1) substantially rational citizenship and democratic participation and (2) functionally rational planning in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction and in subsequent texts. Mannheim's debt to Weber, for both his conceptual framework and his problem focus, is particularly evident in this study. Boucock reminds us, without making it his real business to do so, how important was the task that Weber laid down to his successors when, near the end of his life, he contrasted these two ethics and their implications for what Mannheim (1940) would later call 'fundamental democratization'.
In the following observation, Boucock captures nicely the problems posed by both the increasingly objective process of formal rationality in Weber's analysis and the increasingly formal analytical techniques for studying this process: 'The formal rationalization of modern social arrangements represents a modality of control and mastery involving the objectification and depersonalization of political and economic structures of power and authority ' (p. 39) . What is especially valuable here is that Boucock is from the outset concerned to address the different formally rational properties of capitalism and bureaucracy (among others). He does this in order to show how they interpenetrate and become interdependent, producing over time modalities that are complementary to rather than mirror replicas of one another. The institutional relations between capitalism and bureaucracy, for example, are, or should be, of continuing interest because they (and others) address the potential and actual 'range of variation' possible between real, rather than 'ideal typical', systems and regimes. This in turn points to the necessary underlying complexity where the notions of formal rationality and rationalization are unpacked to reveal that which is specifically 'most worthy of being known' (Loewith, 1970; Schluchter, 1981) .
These concerns are most clearly in evidence, however, in Boucock's major institutional focus -the relation between law, legality and formal rationality and rationalization. Here the emphasis is quite correctly placed on the potential or actual space for freedom under conditions of increasingly 'rational (ized) domination', understood as the lesser evil when compared to uncontrolled and excessively spirited (charismatic) decisionism. Boucock is at his analytical best in the care taken to uncover the deep texture of relations and dependencies between the various forms and manifestations of legal rationality, making clear in the process their tie to rational(ized) domination. Standing behind the proceedings, even more than elsewhere in the text, is Weber himself, asking how any form of domination could be 'rational', what it would mean for human freedom if it could, and implying that if it could, then how could you possibly call such rationality reason? In this vein, Boucock contrasts not only rational and irrational bases and sources of law in Weber, but also the rational and irrational nature of law in its proper application even (or especially) under norms of formal rationality (Kronman, 1983) .
The formal analysis of laws and legal systems is always prejudiced in favor of the positivistic nature of the legal norms at stake, seen as goals to be achieved 'objectively' and instrumentally through calculation. This in contrast to values, which resist reduction to this status, primarily but not only because they relate to or address principle(s), and the principled action that should, but is less and less likely to, follow from them today, Weber implies. Instrumental action, oriented to goals rather than values, is much easier to reduce to ideal typical status in legal rules because the person so acting 'fits' the analytical engine being employed to explain, anticipate and 'rationalize' his/her actions much better. This suggests that for Weber, the auspices of formal legal rationality in particular constitute a far more specific, and actually as well as potentially effective, modality of control of the range of variation in acceptable human conduct than we might think, one with the most serious implications for individual freedom. The extent to which Boucock's analysis of these auspices relies on the types of human action found in the initial exposition of 'Basic Sociological Terms' in Weber's Economy and Society, Volume I is evident throughout.
How much tension is tolerable, for example, between reliance on these types for effective disciplined observation and comparison, and the prescriptive bias implicit in their use given the degree to which 'actual action' cannot help but deviate in a substantive direction away from the formal ideal? It is quite clear that the answer given by Weber in this same section is one that was unpersuasive for Weber himself no less than for so many others. Having said this, Boucock is thoroughly on the mark when he draws our attention to the fact that for Weber formal legal rationalism, however unavoidable its problematic characteristics, originally arose in order to enable individuals rather than to subject them to rationalization processes that were not contemplated at the time. 'Weber's conception of formal legal rationality is rooted in liberal presuppositions about individualism, intentionality and the separation of fact and value; formal legal rationality is conceptually congruent with individual autonomy' (p. 65, emphasis added). The problem would then lie in the nature, scope and limits of what constituted 'legitimate' expressions of individualism, and the extent to which its range could not help but be severely restricted in both form and content, thus remaining relatively exclusive and less 'available' to citizens (Durkheim, 1952 (Durkheim, [1893 (Durkheim, , 1902 ; Wilson, 1984) .
The rest of the book opens out and develops further these themes and concerns, then applies them to a case study of sorts that addresses the question of how well the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of the Canadian Constitution, as interpreted by the Canadian Supreme Court, protects individual freedoms. Boucock sees this not only as a 'constitutionalization' of individual rights, but also as an example of the 'pervasive legalization of social relationships', thus indicating from the outset his determination to employ the formal/substantive distinction in Weber's typology of law to answer the question (Mandel, 1994) . Space only permits a summary of Boucock's argument here. He uses this distinction to argue a position contrary to the one that might be seen to emerge from investigations of the relevant Charter cases. Far from Charter adjudication in Canada demonstrating the superiority of formal legal rationality because his investigations have shown it to evidence 'a pattern of incoherent interpretive approaches to the constitution', Boucock argues that it demonstrates instead Weber's prescience.
The following excerpt is worth quoting at length.
This pattern is symptomatic of the contradiction between the 'square' of a formally rational judicial decision-making process and the 'circle' of determining the legal meaning of various individual rights and freedoms: squaring the circle in this case would involve finding rational, legally correct solutions to issues of social and economic policy without reference to extrajuristic values. As Weber's model of modern legal rationality would suggest, the task is impossible precisely because solutions to problems of competing ethical standards must be posited: they are inherently political. Economics has sometimes treated the technical economic problem of the production of commodities as the prime standard of value, while at other times it has regarded the problem of their distribution, of 'social justice', as the standard; occasionally the one has been naïvely identified with the other. (p. 3)
Weber went on to state that 'an alternative perspective' in the form of 'a science of man' lies implicit in economics, one that 'investigates above all the quality of the human beings bred by these economic and social conditions of existence'. (p. 3)
From this, Hennis surmises that Weber's massive corpus should be read anew through different lenses, something all the more necessary in light of the fact that to date 'Weber has made little impact upon the modern social sciences' (p. 6). To the question: 'Is there a Weberian Anthropology?', Hennis answers no, if what is meant is a 'systematically conceived' contribution, but states that: 'This does not however prevent us from arguing that his "problematic" is "anthropological" in character' (p. 13). For Hennis, verstehen in particular, but other concepts no less central to Weberian analysis, provides evidence that Weber saw himself engaged in carrying out a research programme, one where sociology provided the method, generically speaking, but anthropology the overall orientation and spirit of the inquiry (p. 13). I shall return to this claim shortly.
Hennis's additional emphasis on biography and the biographical is also very much to the point, as long as this focus does not lead to attempts to explain through what I shall call 'reduction without remainder', which it does not in this study (Mitzman, 1970; Wilson, 1971) . In effect, 'objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder' (Adorno, 1973 (Adorno, [1966 : 5). While one can clearly justify seeing certain biographical facts through the lenses of Marxism, psychoanalysis or sociology of knowledge, for example, the exercise should never be used to annihilate the 'objective content' that still remains after the procedure has been completed. These reductive processes must be undertaken in full recognition that the explanations they provide are not only necessarily incomplete but also severely problematic if applied in zero-sum, binary fashion solely to challenge or negate the value of the truth claims being made. This is especially necessary when, for example, the subject's economic class or social status group, upbringing and conflicts with parents, or configuration of interests leads the biographer to discount or devalue the subject's statements, observations, concepts and theories. Indeed, following on the observations of Antoni and Jaspers, among others, this reviewer would argue that it is precisely these connections that make of Weber in particular a man uniquely of his age (Antoni, 1962; Jaspers, 1964) . For me, Weber's class position, upbringing and conflicts with parents and interests increase the likelihood that his statements, observations, concepts and theories have truth-value as knowledge claims (Wilson, 1993) . I think, however, that Hennis would agree that saying this does not mean that Weber is not also a man of our age; the statements are only incompatible in a zero-sum, binary frame of reference that fails to recognize multiple levels and senses of division and distinction. Indeed, this agreement is apparent from the start in the reasons for his persistent, albeit revived, interest in Weber.
Hennis's study is organized and carried out under three sections focused successively on: 'Max Weber's Science of Man'; 'The Value Relation and the Power of Judgment' (in academic and disciplinary work); and 'The "Cultural Problems of Capitalism" '. The book is written in a spirited, and at times eccentric, fashion, exhibiting no fear either of 'authorities' on Weber (occasionally to the author's disadvantage) or even of Weber himself. Hennis's deep concerns about Weber's status and contribution, as suggested, reflect the way he now views his early education and training, when Weber was thought passé by students directly after World War II. His view of Weber as a man of our time as well, based on Weber's attempt to reconcile the two goals of the discipline of economics cited in his Inaugural Lecture of 1895, suggests that he be read as the progenitor of a science of man, literally the father of a family that was stillborn, and (unfortunately) remains so today.
In this endeavor, verstehen, value freedom and the power of judgment can be seen as Weber's way of turning one aspect of his personality to the task of studying the values, practices and institutions of modern Western civilization as if it were an alien culture. This orientation is evident to the reviewer, among many other places, in Weber's introduction to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and in parts of his 'vocation' address on 'science'. As such, it addresses critically the limits of the dichotomy between culture and civilization so central to his brother's work (Alfred Weber, 1947) . It is as if Weber's preoccupation with questions like 'Why this apparent line of development?', 'Why this institutional outcome?' and 'Why these relations between institutions?' necessitates verstehen and value freedom, albeit in the light of efforts to acknowledge one's values to the extent possible, because only through such 'discipline' can 'his own' culture be studied as if it were 'other' to him. While it is true that sociologists may use these protocols in small-scale empirical studies, they do not normally do so when the canvas gets broader and more complex. In contrast, anthropologists are normally required to confine their undisciplined and ad hominem remarks to field notes, as Malinowski did in his study of the Trobriand Islanders and elsewhere (Malinowski, 1948 (Malinowski, [1929 (Malinowski, ], 1967 ).
Hennis's discussion of Weber's failure as a teacher and educator concludes the first section of Part II, and suggests the following reasons for this failure. Weber's 'brittle pedagogic eros', the 'impenetrability of his scholarship', his intolerance of 'personality and self-importance', his 'exceptional failure as a political theorist' concerned to defend 'plebiscitary and charismatic democracy', and his critical pronouncements on the restrictions inherent in academic practices (pp. 101-3 ). Yet at least some of these reasons may in fact explain why he is so central a figure today, along with those suggested at the outset. In all three sections, Hennis brings to light intellectual connections with and commentary about Weber that are not generally found in the Weber reading canon, at least not in North America. Examples would include: Weber's interest in 'characterology'; the impact of spiritualism and James' Varieties of Religious Experience; charisma as a more available basis than we thought for 'inner transformation' (Shils, 1965; Wilson, 1995) ; the pedagogic background and events leading up to the Methodenstreit (Cahnman, 1964) ; and the influence on Weber of Friedrich Albert Lange.
Hennis's appreciation of Weber's ambiguous legacy, evident at the beginning of Chapter 5, can also be found in his earlier work titled Max Weber's Central Question (2000 [1987 ). Both texts underscore the transience of fame, fashion and notoriety, in academic and intellectual circles no less than in other areas of contemporary life. While Weber has variously been in and out of fashion, the reviewer concludes that the generation-based divisions used to break up the period since his death in 1920 mean almost nothing when seen against the backdrop of his continuing presence. This presence is a function of the persistence of his work, and the fact that it is truly a world-historical, cross-cultural and epochal achievement. Just read what Weber has to say about 'capitalism' in Economy and Society and elsewhere, for example, as Hennis makes clear in Part III and Swedberg does throughout, and the assumption that his analysis must be outdated will immediately fade away (see Wilson, 2002 ). Weber has been there all the time waiting for us to discover and rediscover him with the help of writers like Hennis, confirming the need in this case to (re)address his work in light of his commitment to an anthropology, a science, of man. It is really quite surprising how many substantive and methodological aspects of Weber's work take on a new coherence, sense and unity once a commitment to this neglected frame of reference is acknowledged.
IV
Richard Swedberg's impressive study of Max Weber as the founder of the idea, and to some extent the discipline, of economic sociology intersects with the concerns of both Boucock and Hennis, while nonetheless having its own foci, contents and line of argument. Like Boucock, Swedberg discusses the importance of Weber's sociology of law, in this case in order to show how fundamental to his economic sociology law and legality are (Chapter 4). Like Hennis, but even more so, Swedberg is centrally preoccupied with the role that capitalism plays in virtually necessitating a sociology that is uniquely economic in nature, but not absent a social dimension as a consequence. Hennis, as noted, believes he sees the rudiments of a Weberian anthropology, a science of man, implicit in Weber's concern, expressed at his Freiburg Inaugural Lecture in 1895, to study the effects of capitalism on 'the quality of the human beings bred by these economic and social conditions of existence'.
Swedberg's case for the central role of an economic sociology in Weber's analysis of modern Western civilization, while more modestly conceived, is persistently and consistently addressed to this major task throughout. In his introduction, Swedberg notes Weber's concern to develop an economic sociology that would provide 'a practical and efficient type of analysis', stating that for Weber this would necessarily involve 'a social dimension', albeit not a sociology per se. Only later on did Weber 'set out to lay a solid conceptual foundation for sociology' that would integrate social with interest-driven concerns (pp. 4-6). It appears from this that both Hennis and Swedberg believe Weber intended an economic sociology that integrated a focus on 'interests' with one on the social dimension. The question is whether and to what extent the result might be said to constitute an anthropology or science of man, given the fact that Weber seems to have indicated this intention as early in his academic career as 1895.
What leads this reviewer to believe that the two analyses are congruent on this score is the following extended remark by Swedberg, also in the introduction:
One particularly suggestive quality of Weber's economic sociology is the way that he conceptualized economic action and attempted to introduce a social dimension into the analysis of economic behavior. According to Weber, all the cultural sciences (not only sociology, in other words) analyze phenomena that are constituted through the meaning that people invest in them. This applies to economic theory as to history and psychology. What sets sociology apart and makes it into a science of its own is consequently something other than meaning per se. Sociology focuses more precisely on the way that people's actions are oriented to the behavior of others. . . . When applied to economic phenomena, sociology looks at behavior that is driven mainly by material interests and also oriented to the behavior of others. In other words, economic social action, the basic unit in Weber's economic sociology, differs from economic action, the basic unit in economic theory, in that it is driven by material interests and directed at utility, but also takes the behavior of others into account.
(p. 5)
Swedberg's text is organized into six chapters on 'The Rise of Western Capitalism', 'Basic Concepts in Weber's Economic Sociology', 'The Economy and Politics', 'The Economy and Law', 'The Economy and Religion', 'Epilogue: Weber's Vision of Economic Sociology' and a detailed appendix on the evolution of 'Weber's Thought on Economics'. This appendix includes relevant sources on the subjects addressed in the appendix, as well as a chronology of Weber's development and economic themes. There are also copious and thorough explanatory notes for each chapter and the appendix that run to a total of just under 100 single-spaced pages. Not only is the text broken down within each chapter employing a number of useful pedagogic devices for explicating the themes, prerequisites, hypotheses, and so on the author believes to be appropriate for an effective presentation and discussion, it is accompanied by almost 40 very useful illustrations, in the form of pedagogically friendly, yet comprehensive diagrams clarifying the overall line of argument Swedberg is developing.
The result is an intellectually superb analysis that is also a professor's dream as a class text (advanced, upper-level) , both on its own as a self-contained source and as a basis for discussion involving the many sources and references cited. The reviewer found the extended discussion in Chapter 6 of Weber's economic sociology particularly fruitful because it suggests congruence with Hennis's thesis regarding an anthropology or science of man, but only if reconciled with the intellectual detail from other disciplines and the prodigious work for which Weber became well known. Swedberg carries out this detailed and comprehensive study of the context, scope and nature of Weber's project for an economic sociology in an enviable fashion in every respect: comprehensiveness, coherence, clarity, expository form and style, along with frequent synthetic and analytic innovations in his treatment of the subject.
V
Together these three studies commend themselves to the reader interested for whatever reason in the relation between rationality, law and sociology as intersecting concerns and preoccupations in Weber's life as well as in his work. The issue of rationality, although discussed mainly with reference to Boucock's study, still constitutes something of an intellectual fulcrum in any review of texts on Max Weber. This is true for the very important reason that rationality constitutes both the standard and the problematic for him, and does so for both the analysis of reality and the way that we try to go about studying it in a disciplined and theoretically responsible way. No one made it the fulcrum to the extent that Weber did, and no one to date has come anywhere near Weber's success in doing so, regardless of how 'popular' and 'fashionable' Weber may or may not have been over the past century or more through the reception of his work and its impact.
The most important vehicle whereby Weber achieved this result was the distinction between formal and substantive rationality. After all, it was formal rationality that became both the material and the analytical touchstone, with substantive rationality the residual both as standard and as problematic for him, however skeptical and guarded was his endorsement of Western institutions exhibiting it (Wilson, 1973 (Wilson, , 2000 . Whether we are talking about formally rational capital accounting practices, formally rational bureaucracy, formally rational legal systems and defenses of rights or Weber's telling observation that in the final analysis the concept 'substantive' is itself a 'formal' analytical concept in sociology rather than the reverse, the point is clear. Weber's attempts to address the limits and insufficiencies of formal rationality in the sphere of individualism and freedom benefits from Boucock's case study of the failure of the constitutionalization of rights in Canada. Weber also benefits from the care and detail with which Swedberg addresses economic action, economic rationality, economic sociology and the idea of formal rationality as the basis of a method of social and economic research as central concerns of Weber. Finally, Weber benefits from Hennis's efforts to explain the intended if not actual role played by Weber's reconciliation of formal rationality and 'culture' in his analysis of the problems of capitalism. The same is also true for the role of, and emphasis upon, new biographical facts in suggesting a grander 'anthropological' vision, one that sees the project of an economic sociology as a prolegomenon to or basis for a 'science of man'.
My only caveats here concern Weber's career-long preoccupation with the cultural significance of rational capitalism for Western modernity. Each of these studies can be read as both a symptom and a diagnosis expressive of the current resurgence of interest in Weber's work noted in the introductory section. In Boucock's case, it is the air of fateful progress and historical determinism that hangs over aspects of his analysis. In Hennis's, it is his tendency to play down or ignore some of the more formal and systematic properties implicit in Weber's research problematic. In Swedberg's, it is his lack of emphasis on the institutional and cultural matrix and central role of bureaucratic capitalism. Having said this, these caveats are not intended to detract in any way from the strong points already mentioned. Perhaps what I am really suggesting is that these texts be understood to complement each other, and that those interested in Weber consider reading them together for maximum effect as this reviewer has done.
conservatism, Legitimacy and the Theory of Public Capital (2002) . Two volumes of his essays on social and political thought will be published soon. Most of his work now centers on the impact of spatial and temporal values and assumptions on social, political and economic institutions and practices. 
